Radio Broadcasting as an Infringement of a Copyright by Bladek, Steven L.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 27 | Issue 3 Article 3
1939
Radio Broadcasting as an Infringement of a
Copyright
Steven L. Bladek
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bladek, Steven L. (1939) "Radio Broadcasting as an Infringement of a Copyright," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 27 : Iss. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol27/iss3/3
RADIO BROADCASTING AS AN INFRINGEMENT
OF A COPYRIGHT
By STEvEN T. BADFm*
With the advent of radio, judicial tribunals were confronted
for the first time with legal problems both new and perplexing.
Litigation, many times novel in character, was presented to the
courts of this and other countries for interpretation and solution.
Prior to 1920, radio broadcasting was an undeveloped principle.
With the meteoric rise of broadcasting stations, perfection of the
new art, creation of coast-to-coast networks, and commercialism
in this newest business field, it was not long before unusual legal
situations arose to tax the judicial minds of the country's lead-
ing jurists. Since specific legislation had not as yet been enacted,
it rested upon the ingenuity of the courts to safely guide the
new-borne doctrine to correct solutions.
Among the early problems with which the courts were faced,
was the question whether radio broadcasting constituted an in-
fringement of a copyright. The author in this article will at-
tempt to trace the difficulties facing the courts in solving the
problem, from the earliest date to that of the present. The
decisions are not numerous, and a careful analysis and interpre-
tation of the cases will be attempted in the honest hope that the
reader will be better fitted to understand the situation as it
stands today.1
* LL. B. Univ. of Ky., 1938; now practicing law with Nicholas
Martini, 668 Main Avenue, Passaic, N. J.
'For early state of the law, see: (Annotations) 40 A. L. R. 1513;
66 A. L. R. 1366; 76 A. L. R. 1276; 82 A. L. R. 1109; 89 A. L. R. 424;
104 A. L. R. 876. Leading articles: Simpson, Broadcasting as Copy-
right Infringement, 1 Air L. Rev. 134 (1930); Sprague, Copyright and
the Jewell-LaSalle Case, 3 Air L. Rev. 417 (1932); Silverstein & Spill,
Radio Reception as Public Performance, 12 B. U. L. Rev. 243 (1932);
Caldwell, The Broadcasting of Copyrighted Works, 1 J. Air L. 584
(1930); Caldwell, Piracy of Broadcast Programs, 30 Col. L. Rev. 1087
(1930); Caldwell, The Copyright Problems of Broadcasters, 2 J. Radio
L. 287 (1932); Zollman, Radio and Copyright, 11 Marq. L. Rev. 146
(1927); Davis, Copyright and Radio, 16 Va. L. Rev. 40 (1929). For
other notes on the subject, see: 20 Calif. L. Rev. 77 (1931); 99 Cent.
L. J. 130 (1926); 24 Col. L. Rev. 90 (1924); 31 Col. L. Rev. 1044 (1931);
17 Corn. L. Q. 263 (1931); 20 Geo. L. J. 215 (1931); 39 Harv. L. Rev.
269 (1925); 43 Harv. L. Rev. 318 (1929); 47 Harv. L. Rev. 703 (1934);
26 Ill. L. Rev. 443 (1932); 26 Ill. L. Rev. 811 (1932); 1 J. Radio L. 367
(1931); 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1076 (1931); 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 529 (1929);
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The right of Congress to protect authors and composers is
gathered from the United States Constitution, which provides
that Congress shall have power: "To promote the progress of
Science and the Useful Arts, by securing for a limited time to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." 2
It is perfectly well settled that the protection given to copy-
rights is wholly statutory.3 In the last analysis, therefore, all
of our cases will turn upon the construction of a statute.
By Congressional Act of March 4, 1909,4 "Any person
entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of the Copy-
right Act shall have the exclusive right... (e) to perform the
copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composi-
tion and for the purposes of public performance for profit."
The Act further reads: "If any person shall infringe the copy-
right in any work protected under the copyright laws of the
United States, such person shall be liable:
(a) To an injunction restraining such infringement .. .
(b) To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as
the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringe-
ment, as well as the profits which the infringer shall have made
from such infringement, and in proving profits, the plaintiff shall
be required to prove sales only, and the defendant shall be re-
quired to prove every element of cost which he claims, or in lieu
of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the court shall
appear to be just ... though not less than $250.00."r,
Continuing: "Any person who wilfully and for profit shall
infringe any copyright secured by this title, or who shall know-
ingly and wilfully aid or abet such infringement, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be
punished by imprisonment for not exceeding one year or by a fine
6f not less than $100.00 nor more than $1,000.00, or both, in the
9 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 180 (1931); 10 N. C. L. Rev. 203 (1931); 9 Ore.
L. Rev. 182 (1929); 15 St. Louis L. Rev. 100 (1929); 20 Va. L. Rev.
911 (1934); 34 Yale L. J. 109 (1924).
2 U. S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8.
' White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (1908).
'Act March 4, 1909, c. 320, See. 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909); 17 U. S.
C. A., Sec. 1 (1927).
5Act March 4, 1909, c. 320, Sec. 25, 35, Stat. 1081 (1909), as
amended by Act March 24, 1912, c. 356, 37 Stat. 489 (1912); 17 U. S.
C. A., Sec. 25 (1927).
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discretion of the court: Provided, however, that nothing in
this title shall be construed as to prevent the performance of
religious or secular works ... provided the performance is given
for charitable and educational purposes and not for profit.'"'
As to the intent of this proviso, the Supreme Court of the United
States in a recent case7 said: "This proviso must contemplate
the charge of an admission fee, because if the performance is
really not 'for profit', it would be perfectly lawful, both under
Section 1(e), and under the prior provision of Section 28 itself.
We must attribute a more plausible intention to Congress. We
think it was to permit certain high class religious and educa-
tional compositions to be performed at public concerts where an
admission fee is charged, provided the proceeds are applied to a
charitable or educational purpose.'' s
It would logically seem to follow that the exclusive right of
the copyright owner, under the Act, would extend only to a
"public performance for profit". A public performance which
involved no profit, and a private performance though involving
profit would not come within the confines of the aet.9 The two
elements, therefore, which we shall always search for, will be a
"public performance" and "for profit". If they are combined,
the Act of Congress will protect the author against an infringe-
ment.
We must first determine what constitutes a "performance
for profit". In the case of John Church v. Hilliard Hotel Co.,19
plaintiffs owned a copyright of a musical comedy which con-
tained a song entitled: "From Maine to Oregon", and had a
separate copyright for the song, also publishing it separately.
Defendant hotel company caused said song to be performed in
its dining-room for the entertainment of its guests during meal
times by an orchestra employed and paid by the hotel. Plain-
tiff claimed that this was a "public performance for profit".
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held that the
'Act March 4, 1909, c. 320, Sec. 28, 35 Stat. 1082 (1909); 17 U. S.
C. A., Sec. 28 (1927).
" John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co. (C. C. A. N. Y.), 221 Fed.
229, 136 C. C. A. 639 (1915); (certiorari granted), 241 U. S. 665,
36 Sup. Ct. 551 (1916); and reversed on other grounds, Herbert v.
Shanley, 242 U. S. 591, 37 Sup. Ct. 232, 61 L. Ed. 511 (1917).
0 Notes on Decisions, 17 U. S. C. A., page 143.
'Jerome H. Remick Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co.
(D. C., Ohio), 298 Fed. 628, 632 (1924).
10 (C. C. A. N. Y.), 221 Fed. 229, 136 C. C. A. 639 (1915).
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performance in the hotel dining-room, though intended to in-
crease patronage, but for which no admission fee was charged,
was not a "performance for profit", since the words "for
profit", as used in the Copyright Act, mean a direct "pecuniary
charge for the performance, such as an admission fee.""
In Herbert v. Slunley,12 a test case, the problem as to what
constituted "a profit" within the meaning of the Copyright Act
reached the Supreme Court. The exact question presented was
"whether the performance of a copyrighted musical composition
in a restaurant or hotel without a charge for admission to hear it
infringes the exclusive right of the copyright to perform the
work publicly for profit?" Plaintiffs were the composers and
owners of the comic opera "Sweethearts", containing a song of
the same title. Both the opera and the song were copyrighted,
the song being published and sold separately. The Shanley
Company, defendant, operated a public restaurant in New York
City, and employed performers to entertain the patrons. There
was no admission fee charged by the restaurant. Defendants
caused said song to be performed by its professional enter-
tainers. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin the unauthorized per-
formance. The Federal District Court,13 and the Circuit Court
of Appeals,' 4 both denied relief, in the ground that since there
was no direct charge to the public, the performance was not one
"for profit". The United States Supreme Court, however,
reversed the decisions of the lower courts, on the ground that
even though the charge to the public was indirect, it was never-
theless sufficient to make the performance one "for profit".
Mr. Justice Holmes, who wrote the opinion, said:
"If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a perform-
ance where money is taken at the door, they are very imperfectly pro-
tected. Performances not different in kind from those of the defend-
ants could be given that might compete with and even destroy the
success of the monopoly that the law intends the plaintiff to have.
It is enough to say that there is no need to construe the statute so
narrowly. The defendants' performances are not eleemosynary. They
are part of a total for which the public pays, and the fact that the
price of the whole is attributed to a particular item which those pres-
ent are expected to order, is not important. It is true that the music
is not the sole object, but neither is the food, which probably could
be got cheaper elsewhere. The object is a repast in surroundings that
to people having limited powers of conversation or disliking the rival
11221 Fed. 229. 231.
11242 U. S. 591, 37 Sup. Ct. 232, 61 L. Ed. 511 (1917), reversing
229 Fed. 340, 143 C. C. A. 460 (1915).
'a222 Fed. 344 (S. D. N. Y., 1915).
14229 Fed. 340, 143 C. C. A. 460 (1916).
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noise give a luxurious pleasure not to be had from eating a silent
meal. If music did not pay, it would be given up. If it pays it pays
out of the public's pockets. Whether it pays or not, the purpose of
employing it Is profit and that is enough."'1
So, with the Shanley case, we can safely say that even
though no direct admission fee is charged, or no profit actually
made, a performance for which an indirect charge is exacted,
will amount to a performance for profit. 16
In the leading case of M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger &
Co.,1 7 an analagous situation in radio broadcasting is presented.
The Bamberger Company, a department store, operated a radio
department, and radio broadcasting station WOR. The
petitioner was the owner of the copyright of the song "Mother
Machree". Petitioner alleged an infringement of his copyright,
and sought by injunction to prevent further performance. The
Bamberger Company claimed that since there was no charge or
cost to the listeners, there was no performance "for profit".
The company's slogan, however, was broadcast at the beginning
and end of every performance. The Federal District Court of
New Jersey granted the injunction, stating that the obvious pur-
pose of the broadcasts was to stimulate sales through advertising.
This was held to be an element of indirect profit, and sufficient
to constitute an infringement, even as in the Shanley case.' 8
The Bamberger case, therefore, gives us the rule that a broad-
caster who broadcasts a copyrighted musical composition per-
formed in his studio is engaged in a public performance "for
profit" of that composition, and is liable for the infringement if
he is not authorized by the copyright owner.'i
It is interesting to notice that in the Bamberger case, the
defendant company brought forth the contention that petitioner
1 242 U. S. 591 at 594. Accord: Harms v. Cohen (D. C., Pa.)
279 Fed. 276 (1922). (The playing of music in a motion picture
theatre to which a charge for admission was made was a performance
for profit within meaning of the Copyright Act, though the music was
selected because fitting and appropriate to the action of that portion
of the picture at that precise instant being shown on the screen.)
Witmark v. Pastime Amusement Co. (D. C. S. C.), 298 Fed. 470 (1924)
(The rendering of copyright music as incidental to a motion picture
show Is a performance thereof for profit.) Witmark v. Calloway
(D. C., Tenn.), 22 Fed. (2d) 412 (1927).
.6 Accord: Performing Right Society v. Hawthorne Hotel, Ltd.,
149 L. T. R. 425 (Chanc., 1933).
17291 Fed. 776 (D. C., N. J., 1923).f Supra, note 11.
"For foreign decisions in accord, see Caldwell, Broadcasting of
Copyrighted Works, 1 J. Air L. 584, 586, footnote 12.
K. L. J.-5
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was receiving free advertising service for his musical com-
position. District Judge Lynch answered this by saying:
"Our own opinion of the possibilities of advertising by radio leads
us to the belief that the broadcasting of a newly copyrighted musical
composition would greatly enhance the sales of the printed sheet. But
the copyright owners and the music publishers themselves are perhaps
the best judges of the method of popularizing musical selections. There
may be various methods of bringing them to the attention of music
lovers. It may be that one type of song is treated differently than a
song of another type. But, be that as it may, the method, we think, is
the privilege of the owner. He has the exclusive right to publish and
vend, as well as to perform."'
To-day, there would be another reason why the argument of
the defendant that the song receives free advertising would have
failed. If we were to follow logically the argument to a con-
clusion, we would immediately see that the free advertising
would be a detriment rather than a benefit. In 1923, when the
tamberger case was decided, and radio still a recent art, there
may have been a benefit accruing to the musical selection
through advertising. However, with the rapid rise of broad-
casting stations throughout the country, the frequent repetition
of a musical composition over a number of stations by orchestra's
.vocalists, and recordings, would soon cause the composition to
die a rapid death. The situation has advanced so rapidly, that
the Society of Authors, Composers and Publishers has been
forced to place certain musical numbers on a "restricted list"
in order to prevent their being repeated too often, else a
selection's average life or popular span would be tremendously
decreased. Thus, the argument advanced by the Bamberger
Company would of necessity have failed.
In the year following the Bamberger decision, the court, in
Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories
Co.,21 considered the question as to whether a broadcast con-
stituted a "public performance". In that case, defendant was
a manufacturer of radio sets, and the owner of a broadcasting
station in Cincinnati. Plaintiff was the owner of a copyright on
the composition "Dreamy Melody". Defendant caused said
composition to be played over his station by means of an
orchestra and vocalist. Plaintiff alleged that the act was a
"public performance for profit", and sought an injunction to
prevent further performance. The Federal District Court held,
2291 Fed. 776, 780.
n 298 Fed. 628. (D. C., Ohio, 1924).
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that since no audience was actually present, this was not a per-
formance within the meaning of the Copyright Act, for under a
strict construction of the Act, an audience was necessary in order
to have a public performance. District Judge Hickenlooper
said:
"In order to constitute a public performance in the sense in which
we think Congress intended the words, it is absolutely essential that
there be an assemblage of persons-an audience congregated for the
purpose of hearing that which transpires at the place of amusement."2'
... "We simply feel that the rendition of a copyrighted piece of music
In the studio of a broadcasting station, where the public are not
admitted and cannot come, but where the sound waves are converted
into radio frequency waves and thus transmitted over thousands of
miles of space to be at last reconverted into sound waves in the homes
of the owners of receiving sets, is no more a public performance in the
studio, within the intent of Congress, than the perforated music roll
which enables the reproduction of copyrighted music by one without
musical education, is a copy of such music. A private performance for
profit is not within the act, nor is a public performance not for profit.
All contemplate an audience which may hear the rendition itself
through the transmission of sound waves, and not merely a reproduc-
tion of the sound by means of mechanical device and electro-magnetic
waves In ether."-3
On appeal, the case was reversed,24 the court saying: "A
performance is no less public because the listeners are not
assembled within an inclosure, or gathered together in some
open stadium, or park, or other public place. Nor can a per-
formance be deemed private because each listener may enjoy it
alone in the privacy of his home. Radio broadcasting is intended
to, and in fact does, reach a very much larger number of the
public at the moment of the rendition than any other medium of
performance. The artist is consciously addressing a great,
though unseen and widely scattered, audience, and is therefore
participating in a public performance. '25
It is submitted that the modern radio audience at present
day broadcasts would have made the opinions in the Rernick
case far easier of solution. The radio broadcasting studio to-day
is really a radio theatre, with a visible audience of thousands of
people who see, as well as hear, the performance. Brodcasting
stations have for the past number of years been appropriating
and building radio show palaces where an audience is able to
view the proceedings at all times.
1 298 Fed. 628, 631.
298 Fed. 628, 632.
"Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co.(C. C. A. Ohio) 5 Fed. (2d) 411 (1925), reversing 298 Fed. 628. Cer-
tiorari denied, 269 U. S. 556, 46 Sup. Ct. 19, 70 L. Ed. 22 (1925).5 F. (2d) 411, 412.
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The Remick case further sustained the view that the phrase
"for profit" did not mean that a direct admission charge must
be made for musical compositions rendered in public, insofar as
the purpose of publicly playing the pieces was to attract
customers or satisfy them, it was sufficient to bring them within
the confines of the Copyright Act. Furthermore, the fact that
radio was not developed at the time the Federal Copyright Act
was amended, did not prevent the radio from coming within the
purview of the Act, since the Act may be applied to new situa-
tions not anticipated by Congress, and if fairly construed, such
situations come within its intent and meaning.20
In the case of Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric
Co.,27 the court was faced with the question whether one who
merely broadcasts by microphone an authorized copyrighted
musical selection, but who otherwise has no connection with the
actual rendition of the song, was an infringer within the
meaning of th.e Copyrighted Act. The court answered the
question in the negative on the ground that if the orchestra
rendering the selection was authorized by the owner of the copy-
right, the broadcasting was not an infringement, and moreover,
that the performance was by the person or persons rendering the
song, and not the performance of the broadcaster. Said the court:
"So far as practical results are concerned, the broadcaster of the
authorized performance of a copyrighted musical selection does
little more than the mechanic who rigs an amplifier or loud-
speaker in a large auditorium to the end that persons in remote
sections of the hall may hear what transpires so upon its stage
or rostrum. Such broadcasting merely gives the authorized per-
former a larger audience, and is not to be regarded as a separate
or distinct performance of the copyrighted composition upon the
part of the broadcaster. "28
This would, seemingly, indicate that under certain condi-
tions the act of broadcasting, by itself, would not constitute a sep-
arate "public performance" of the copyrighted song. From the
dictum in the General Electric case, 29 the court inferred that if
'6Accord: Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 51 Sup.
Ct. 410, 75 L. Ed. 971 (1931).
94 F. (2d) 160 (S. D. N. Y., 1924).
- 4 P. (2d) 160.
'4 F. (2d) 160. ("If a broadcaster procures an unauthorized per-
formance of a copyrighted musical composition to be given, and for
his own profit makes the same available to the public served by radio
receiving sets attuned to his station, he is to be regarded as an
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the performance were unauthorized, then the broadcaster would
be held as a contributory infringer. On the final hearing of the
case on its merits,3 0 it was found that the performance was
actually unauthorized, and the broadcaster was held to have
participated in the infringement, and liable as a contributory
infringer on the ground that he participated in the infringer
ment by actively engaging himself in "transmitting to the radio
audience the unauthorized production." Therefore, where the
original rendition is unauthorized, the performer is primarily
liable, and with him, the broadcaster, whom the courts designate
as a "contributory infringer". Said the court:
"Certainly those who listen do not perform and therefore do not
Infringe. Can it be said with any greater reason that one who enables
others to hear participates in the unauthorized performance, so as to
be a contributory infringer? Surely not, if, as is argued by analogy,
he merely leaves the windows open, so that the strains of the music
may be heard by those in the street below. Such is not the case of
the broadcaster, equipped with instruments animated by electricity
constantly furnished, who throughout the performance of the orchestra
picks up each note, translates it into electrical energy, and transmits
it to persons within a radius of several hundred miles, so that they
may hear the original sound. It is not enough to say that the broad-
caster merely opens the window, and the orchestra does the rest. On
the contrary, the acts of the broadcaster are found in the reactions of
his instruments, constantly animated and controlled by himself, and
those acts are quite as continuous and infinitely more complex than
the playing of the selection by the members of the orchestra.
That in the process of transmission there is no audible rendition
of the musical production until it is heard by the owners of radio
receiving sets merely emphasizes the fact that the broadcaster is
actively engaged in transmitting to the radio audience the original
unauthorized production. In so doing, it seems clear that he partici-
pates in the infringement. Certainly, if he broadcasts without author-
ity from the owner of the copyright a private rehearsal of a copyrighted
production, he contributes to the resultant infringement. If, in the
case at bar, the public had not been present in the public ballroom of
the hotel while the orchestra continued to play, and the broadcaster
to broadcast, he would have contributed to the infringement while the
public was absent; but the presence or absence of an audience in the
hotel cannot change the character of his acts of contributory
infringement."'"
It must be remembered that reproduction of musical corn-
Infringer. It may also be that he becomes a contributory infringer in
the event he broadcasts the unauthorized performance by another of a
copyrighted musical composition.")
' Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co., 16 F. (2d)
829 (1926).
" 16 F. (2d) 829.
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positions vocally or orchestrally,3 2 or on piano rolls,38 or phono-
graph records,8 4 when performed publicly for profit ednstitutes
infringement within the Copyright Act. It is no defense that
no notice of the copyright appeared on the original.3 5 To this
can now be added radio broadcasting.3 6 Intention to infringe is
unnecessary. 37  The result, and not the intention, determines
the question of infringement. 38 Control over the infringing
performance is not a necessary element of liability.3 9 Further-
more, the fact that radio was unknown at the time the Copyright
Act was passed does not prevent broadcasting from being an
infringement of copyright.40
The next question deals with the situation where the broad-
casting of a copyrighted musical composition is brought to the
audience by means of a receiving set and loudspeaker. In Buck
v. Duncan,41 plaintiffs, the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers filed suit against the defendant company,
which operates the LaSalle Hotel in Kansas City, and defendant
Duncan, operating station KWKC. The hotel maintained a
master receiving set which was wired to each of the public and
private rooms for the entertainment of its guests. Thusly, pro-
grams received on the master set were transmitted simultaneously
to all parts of the building. Defendants were notified by the
Society to secure a license to play the Society's copyrighted
numbers. This request was not complied with, and subsequently,
the broadcaster played two musical compositions copyrighted
22Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U. S. 591, 37 Sup. Ct. 232, 61 L. Ed.
511 (1917); Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (D. C., Pa., 1922); Irving
Berlin v. Daigle, 31 F. (2d) 832 (1929).
Lutz v. Buck, 40 F. (2d) 501 (1930); Buck v. Lester, 24 F. (2d)
877 (1928).
"Buek v. Heretis, 24 F. (2d) 876 (1928).
"Buck v. Heretis, 24 F. (2d) 876 (1928).
"Witmark & Sons v. Bamberger Co., 291 Fed. 776 (1923); Remick
v. Amer. Auto. Ace. Co., 5 F. (2d) 411 (1925); Remick v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 16 F. (2d) 829 (1926); Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Co., 283 U. S. 191,
51 Sup. Ct. 410, 75 L. Ed. 971 (1931).
"I Stern v. Remick Co., 175 Fed. 282 (1910); Haas v. Leo Feist,
Inc., 234 Fed. 105 (1916).
"$Witmark v. Calloway, 22 F. (2d) 412 (1927).
" Dreamland Ballroom, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F. (2d)
354 (1929). (The owner of a dance hall was liable for an infringing
performance even though the orchestra was an independent contractor
over which defendant had no control, and for whose acts it would not
ordinarily be liable.)
"Remick v. Amer. Auto. Ace. Co., 5 F. (2d) 411 (1925).
, Same v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 32 F. (2d) 366 (D. C. Mo.,
1929).
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and owned by the plaintiffs, and these were received and heard
through the apparatus maintained by defendant hotel. Plain-
tiffs sued for an injunction against the broadcaster, and hotel
owner, alleging an infringement of their copyright. The lower
court rendered a judgment for damages and injunction
against the broadcaster, but denied relief against the hotel, on
the ground that the reception of broadcast music by the hotel did
not constitute a performance within the meaning of the Copy-
right Act. Said the court: "The defendant had a right to have
a radio in its hotel for the entertainment of its guests and to
operate that radio. If, while it was operating, someone other
than the defendant, wholly without defendant's participation,
put upon the ether and so threw into defendant's radio electric
impulses which came out of the radio as an audible rendition of
a copyrighted musical composition, that was not in any sense the
act of the defendant. The intent of the defendant did not enter
into that act. If it were a performance of a musical composition,
it was a performance not by the defendant, but by the broad-
caster on the defendant's instrument. "42
The court's holding that the hotel did not perform was based
on the analogies of a deaf person who hears a piano rendition by
means of an amplifier which he operates, a person who hears a
piano rendition by means of a telephone, and a person who opens
a window and hears a street band. "He who only hears the per-
formance is not performing. It can be said that if the sound
waves from a piano fall on the unaided ears of a listener, that
listener has no part in the performance, and if he is deaf so that
he cannot hear without the aid of an amplifier electrically
operated which magnifies the sound waves so that they become
perceptible to him, he still has no part in the performance. It is
true in the latter case he has been enabled to hear the music only
by means of a machine operated by himself. By that means he
has made that which was inaudible audible to himself. But he
has not performed, because he has not created. He has heard
only what the performer at the piano created and sent out to be
heard."43
-232 F. (2d) 366, 368.
- 32 F. (2d) 366, 367, 368. (The court further said: "It is true
that if one plays on his phonograph a record of a piece of music, he
is performing. If it is a copyrighted musical composition, and if the
performance Is public and for profit, then his act is an infringement
JENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
And so, in this early case, reception was not a performance.
However, the Society appealed, 44 and the Circuit Court of
Appeals certified the following question to the United States
Supreme Court:
"Do the acts of a hotel proprietor, in making available to his guests,
through the instrumentality of a radio receiving set and loudspeakers
installed in his hotel and under his control and for the entertainment
of his guests, the hearing of a copyrighted musical composition which
has been broadcast from a radio transmitting station, constitute a
performance of such composition within the meaning of See. 1(e) of
the Copyright Act?"
The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirma-
tive,45 Mr. Justice Brandeis delivering the opinion. The Court
considered reception as essentially being a reproduction within
the control of the person receiving the program, and henoe,
within the meaning of the Copyright Act, a "performance".
Said the court:
"We are satisfied that the reception of a radio broadcast and its
translation into audible sound is not a mere audition of the original
of the copyright. Plaintiffs say that there is no difference In principle
between playing by phonograph a record impressed in bakelite, and
playing by radio receiver a record impressed on the ether. Obviously,
there is a difference. The record on bakelite is a separate and distinct
thing from the original performance in the studio where the record
was made. Playing that record is performing anew the musical com-
position imprinted on it. The waves thrown out upon the ether are
not a record of the original performance. They are the original per-
formance. Their reception is not a reproduction, but a hearing, of the
original performance. The reception of a musical composition on a
radio receiver is not a performance at all. Of course, then, the defend-
ant did not perform these copyrighted jazz pieces.
"Moreover, infringement must be an intentional act. I do not
mean by that that one who performs a copyrighted musical composi-
tion publicly for profit is not guilty of infringement merely because
he does not know the piece is copyrighted. The law is otherwise.
There is an intentional performance when, for example, one plays
on an instrument from a sheet of music a piece of music. There is an
intentional performance when one plays on a phonograph record. In
either of these cases, if the performance is public and for profit, there
19 an infringement if the musical composition is copyrighted, and that
whether the performer is or is not cognizant of the copyright.
"Suppose, however, the proprietor of a hotel has a phonograph
playing in his dining room for the entertainment of his guests, and
suppose that without any request from him or participation on his
part, a stranger surreptitiously places in the machine a record of a
copyrighted musical composition. Would it not be unthinkable that
that hotel proprietor would be held guilty of infringement, and sub-jected to damages. His intent in no wise entered into that perform-
ance. If it was a performance, in no sense was it his performance.
It is not possible that mere ownership of a musical instrument carries
with it liability for any use to which another may put the instrument.")
'51 F. (2d) 726 (1931).
's Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 51 Sup. Ct. 410,
'75 L. Ed. 971 (1931).
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program. It is essentially a reproduction. As to the general theory
of radio transmission there is no disagreement. All sounds consist of
waves of relatively low frequencies which ordinarily pass thru the
air and are locally audible. Thus music played at a distant broadcast-
ing station is not directly heard at the receiving set. In the micro-
phone of the radio transmitter the sound waves are used to modulate
electrical currents of relatively high frequencies which are broadcast
through an entirely different medium, conventionally known as the
'ether'. These radio waves are not audible. In the receiving set they
are rectified; that is, converted into direct currents which actuate
the loud speaker to produce again in the air sound waves of audible
frequencies. The modulation of the radio waves in the transmitting
apparatus, by the audible sound waves is comparable to the manner
In which the wax phonograph record is impressed by these same waves
thru the medium of a recording stylus. The transmitted radio waves
require a receiving set for their detection and translation into audible
sound waves, just as the record requires another mechanism for the
reproduction of the recorded composition. In neither case is the
original performance heard; and in the former, complicated electrical
instrumentalities are necessary for its adequate reception and distribu-
tion. Reproduction in both cases amounts to a performance.""
And so, it would seem that all previous decisions inconsistent
with the Jewell case are overruled. Though the court agreed that
the owner of a private radio set who invites friends to his home to
hear a musical composition which is being broadcast would not
be liable for an infringement, yet, a receiving set in a hotel,
restaurant, or other public place was as much a performance as
the one eminating from the broadcasting studio. With the
Jewell case, radio broadcasting must now be regarded as definite-
ly within the meaning of the Copyright Act.47  The copyright
owner's monopoly is completely secured by the Jewell case,
and gives him at the same time the right to control re-
ception so long as it is public and for profit. The case is a
perfect example of the expansion of an old statute covering a new
situation, not in the contemplation of the original enactors.
48
To say the least, the court gave the statute a very liberal con-
struction.
The following hypothetical cases will illustrate the far-
reaching effects of the decisions thus far :4
6283 U. S. at 199. (Compare, Buck v. Heretis, 24 F. (2d) 876
(1928); Irving Berlin v. Daigle, 31 F. (2d) 832, 833 (1929).
"Davis, Copyright and Radio, 16 Va. L. Rev. 40 (1929).
IsJewell case noted: 2 Air L. Rev. 511; 31 Col. L. Rev. 1044;
29 Mich. L. Rev. 1076; 65 U. S. L. Rev. 241; 18 Va. L. Rev. 70. See
also, Caldwell, The Broadcasting of Copyrighted Works, 1 J. Air L. 584
(1930); Caldwell, The Right of the Author With Respect to Broad-
casting, 1 J. Radio L. 28. For translation of foreign decisions, see,
1 J. Radio L. 144.
1 Taken from analagous situations in, Caldwell's, The Copyright
Problems of Broadcasters, 2 J. Radio L. 287 (1930).
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(a) Station XYZ broadcasts a football game. During the
game, a school band plays a restricted number, not covered by the
license. The broadcaster would be liable for infringement. Also,
every hotel, barber shop, ice cream parlor, drug store, etc., which
lets the program through to its listeners over the receiving set
would be liable for an infringement in "publicly performing for
profit".
(b) Again, one of the larger broadcasting chains plays a
restricted number, infringing a copyright. Every station in the
chain, every store, ice cream parlor, etc., would also be held if it
carried the same program for the entertainment of its guests.
This is hard to see. The parties are really innocent infringers.
They have no control over Such playing of a restricted musical
number, and no means of protection, since they do not know that
a restricted number is about to be played. The damages for an
infringement in such case are high, and are in fact a penalty,
since the proceeds go to the copyright owner, and not to the
government.50
Suppose that the broadcaster has a license, but the receiver
has none. In the Jewell case, the Supreme Court left the ques-
tion open. Said the court: "Since the public reception for
profit in itself constitutes an infringement, we have no occasion
to determine under what circumstances a broadcaster will be held
to be a performer, or the effect upon others of his paying a license
fee. 5 1
The nearest solution to this problem was the case of Buck v.
Debaum,52 in which the defendant operated a cafe wherein he
put in a receiving set through which he received programs of
various broadcasters. The station, as distinguished from the
Duncan case, was authorized to broadcast the composition.
Though the court agreed that th.e act of the defendant was both
"public" and "for profit", nevertheless, they held, that he did
not "perform", insofar as the performance occurred entirely in
'*Act March 4, 1909, c. 320, Sec. 25, 35 Stat. 1081 (1909); as
amended, Act Aug. 24, 1912, c. 356, 37 Stat. 489 (1912); 17 U. S. C. A.,
Sec. 25 (1927); Act March 4, 1909, c. 320, Sec. 40, 35 Stat. 1084 (1909);
17 U. S. C. A., Sec. 40 (1927).
283 U. S. 191, 198.
(D. C., Calif.) 40 F. (2d) 734 (1929). (For an excellent criticism
of the Debaum case, see, 10 B. U. L. Rev. 536; also, Caldwell, The
Broadcasting of Copyrighted Works, 1 J. Air L. 584, 590 (1930), for
discussion of foreign decisions.)
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the broadcaster's studio, and the action at the receiving set was
in no sense a reproduction.5 3
In England, the courts have reached conclusions similar to
those of our American tribunals.54 In the case of Chappell v.
The Associated Radio Company of Australasia, Ltd.,55 broad-
casting by radio was held to be a public performance.
In Messager v. British Broadcasting Company50 a similar
conclusion was reached, the court holding that anyone who
switches on a receiving set in public is himself responsible for a
public performance, and will commit an infringement of the
author's copyright, notwithstanding that the performance at the
broadcasting station was authorized. The court in that case
held, that the defendants had performed because: "Instead of
gathering the public into a vast assembly room, they set in
motion certain ether waves knowing that millions of receiving
ibstruments in houses and flats were tuned to the waves set
forth, and knowing and intending also that acoustic representa-
tion of the opera would thereby be given to an enormous music
audience of listeners." 5 7
In the case of Performing Bight Society, Ltd. v. Hammonds
- 40 F. (2d) 734 at 735. ("One who manually or by human agency
merely actuates electrical instrumentalities, whereby inaudible ele-
ments that are omnipresent in the air are made audible to persons who
are within hearing, does not 'perform' within the meaning of the
Copyright Act. The performance in such case takes place in the studio
of the broadcasting station, and the operator of the receiving set in
effect does nothing more than one would do who opened a window and
permitted the strains of music of a passing band to come within the
inclosure in which he located. It is true that it is the voluntary act
of the person turning the dial on the receiving set that enables elec-
tricity to animate the mechanism so as to make audible within hearing
distance of the receiving set that which is disseminated from the
broadcasting station and which is 'on the air' by reason of the broad-
cast, but such voluntary action is far from 'performing' the copy-
righted work. The performance which is licensed occurs entirely in
the studio of the broadcasting station where the copyrighted musical
composition is lawfully used, and the action occurring at the receiving
set is simultaneous therewith, and is in no sense a reproduction of the
musical composition that is being lawfully performed at the broadcast-
ing studio.")
"Copinger, The Law of Copyright (7th ed., 1936), p. 144.
T Victoria L. R., 350 (1925).
- 2 K. B. 543 (1927), though reversed on other grounds, 1 K. B. 660
(1928), opinion of McCardie, J., was cited with approval by the Court
of App. in Performing Right Society, Ltd. v. Hammonds Bradford
Brewery Co. (Chanc. 121, 1934).
17 2 KM B. 543 at 548.
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Bradford Brewery Co.,58 the defendant, a hotel proprietor,
received on his radio a broadcast of copyrighted songs for the
entertainment of his guests. The station was licensed to broad-
cast the music "for domestic and private use only". Plaintiff,
owner of the copyrighted works, sought a judicial declaration
that defendant had put on a public performance in violation of
the Copyright Act.5 9 The court held, that the reception was a
public performance in violation of the copyright.
It is interesting to note that the English court in the
Hammonds case deals with the question of a possible implied
license in favor of the hotel keeper. In the final decision, how-
ever, the proprietor of the hotel was restrained from assuming
the benefits of the contract between the copyright owner and the
broadcaster.
This "implied license" theory has also been discussed by
our American courts. 60 In the Debaum case,61 the court seemed
to think that the reception of the program for commercial pur-
poses was impliedly authorized. Said the court: "It seems to be
clear that, when plaintiffs licensed the broadcasting station to
disseminate the "Indian Love Call" (the composition played),
they impliedly sanctioned and consented to any "pick up" out
of the air that was possible in radio reception."
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The Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers sub-
sequently adopted a standard clause in their license agree-
ments limiting consent of the copyright owner to private
reception, thus preventing any possible implied license. In a
recent case, 63 defendant company operated a two-channel master
receiving set it installed in its New York hotel. The set was
attuned on one channel to station WJZ of the N. B. C. system,
and over this station, defendant heard the rendition of a certain
song, which was sent on to the guest rooms. An employee of the
plaintiffs heard the rendition and reported the occurrence. The
N. B. C. had been licensed by the owners of the copyright to
broadcast the song, but the hotel had no permission, and N. B. C.
5849 T. L. R. 410 (1933), affirmed, 50 T. L. R. 16 (1934) ; Chanc. 121
(1934).
5'1 and 2 Geo. V, c. 46, Sec. 1(2) (1911); 3 Hals. Stat. Eng. 722
(1929).
6Discussed in 15 St. Louis L. Rev. 100, 101 (1930).
140 F. (2d) 734 (1929).
40 F. (2d) 734, 735.
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers, Inc. v. New
York Statler Hotel Co., Inc., 19 Fed. Supp. 1 (D. C. N. Y., 1937).
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had no power to give the hotel permission to perform the song.
Plaintiff sued for damages, and for injunction. The court held,
that the hotel was liable. This ease differs from the Jewefl
case,0 4 in that no public rooms were wired here, only bedrooms
receiving the radio programs. The defendant claimed that since
the N. B. C. had authorization to broadcast the song, the grant
resulted in an "implied license" in favor of the hotel keeper.
The court disagreed with this contention, saying that an
implied license was not possible, since the contract between the
copyright owner and the broadcasting station expressly
negatived any such possibility.
In a recent Canadian case,6 5 a similar result was reached.
The facts were similar to those of the last case, radio music being
rendered by an authorized and licensed broadcast, and made
available to guests of the defendant hotel in the manner of the
Jewell case. The court discussed the possibility of implying a
license, but reached the result of the case before. The court
repudiated the argument of the Debaum case,0 6 saying: "It has
been argued that the defendant could not have anticipated that
the works in question would be transmitted from the broad-
casting stations to which its receiving sets were from time to
time attuned. If the defendant company desired to rebroad-
cast programs received from station CKAC, for the enter-
tainment of its guests, it could have protected itself by first
ascertaining from that station what copyrighted works would be
broadcast during the day, and at what times, and by either
shutting off its receiving set during the time of such perform-
ance, or making the necessary arrangements with the copy-
right owners. "67
The American Society of Authors, Composers and Pub-
lishers (and the similar foreign Performing Right Society) is
undoubtedly the greatest protector of copyrighted material in
the world. The Society was organized to protect the Works of
its members against piracy, 8 and against infringement by
amusement enterprises. The Society has insisted from the very
"283 U. S. 191, 51 Sup. Ct. 410, 75 L. Ed. 971 (1931).
"Canadian Performing Right Society, Ltd. v. Ford Hotel, Ltd.,
2 Dom. L. R. 391 (1935).
"40 F. (2d) 734 (1929).
'2 Dom. L. R. 391, 400.
"See, Caldwell, Piracy of Broadcast Programs, 30 Col. L. Rev. 1087
(1930).
KENT K Y LAw JouRNAL
beginning that radio broadcasting constituted a "public per-
formance for profit" within the meaning of the Copyright
Act.69 The case of Herbert v. Shanley 0o.70 bore th.em out.
The Society insisted that the broadcasting stations make
arrangements for payment of fees to them for the privilege of
using their works, or to totally refrain from any use thereof.
The reluctance of the broadcasters to pay was partly based oi
the fact that no existing law on the subject was then present, and
that the Copyright Act did not include radio broadcasting.
Radio, then, was still a novel thing. It was held not to be a
musical instrument within the meaning of the Tarif Act, 71 or
the Exemption Statutes."2 Recent decisions, however, bore out
the contention of the Society that the Copyright Act was broad
enough to cover the field of radio broadcasting,73 and the stations
were forced to give in. And so, the Society has worked out a
schedule as to the amounts to be paid, basing th.e amount on
such factors as power of the station, extent of commercializing,
surrounding population, etc." 4 The Society now supplies blanket
licenses to various stations, hotels, etc. which afford complete
protection under all circumstances.
To-day, broadcasters are not seeking to perform copy-
righted works without paying for the privilege therefor. The
early struggle to escape payment was the result of not forseeing
the huge commercial status that broadcasting would reach.
The coast-to-coast chains with their large number of stations and
unbelievably tremendous listening audiences have made radio
one of the leading industries of the day.
It must be remembered that radio broadcasting is still a
recent art. It is not, as yet, fully protected by present laws.
Though the purpose of copyright acts, as shown by their histor-
ical development, and their purpose, makes them essentially
monopolistic,7 and the acts given a liberal construction if their
19Act March 4, 1909, c. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909); 17 U. S. C. A.,
Sec. 1 (1927).
' 242 U. S. 591, 37 Sup. Ct. 232, 61 L. Ed. 511 (1917).
Brand Co. v. U. S., 47 T. D. 40649-G. A. 8929 (1925).
,'Dunbar v. Spratt-Snyder, 226 N. W. 22 (Iowa) (1929).
"'Remick & Co. v. Amer. Auto. Acc. Co., 5 Fed. (2d) 411 (1925);
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 51 Sup. Ct. 410, 75 L.
Ed. 971 (1931).14 Davis, Copyright and Radio, 16 Va. L. Rev. 40 (1929).
I Holdsworth, Press Control and Copyright in the 16th and 17th
Centuries, 29 Yale L. J. 841 (1920); see also, Mr. Justice Holmes' opin-
ion in Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U. S. 591, 594.
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purpose is to be accomplished, new laws are badly needed.
Obviously unsuited, and never intended to cover radio, present
laws are inapplicable to the problems raised by radio communi-
cation. A revision of the entire law is most essential.70 Specific
legislation clearly defining the rights and liabilities of all, and
legislation exempting innocent infringers is essential.
Much attention was attracted to the subject at the National
Radio Conference at Washington as early as 1926. A special
committee, headed by the Hon. W. H. White, Congressman from
Alaine, was appointed to hear the different views. Because of
the divergent paths taken by the Society of Authors, Composers
and Publishers on one side, and the individuals representing the
broadcasters on the other, no great success was possible, but the
formation of the committee and its hearings was indicative of
the importance of this problem even at that early date. 7
A few years ago, the Vestal Bill, 7 8 a proposed revision of
the Copyright Act, was presented to Congress. The provisions
of this proposed general revision of the law which effect the
most pronoupced changes in existing law, were as follows:
(1). Automatic Copyright, by which the copyright is conferred
upon the author upon creation of his work, a right so limited by various
provisions of the bill as to be made a privilege.
(2). Divisible Copyright, which permits the assignee, grantee, or
licensee to protect and enforce any right which he acquires from an
author without the complications incident to the old law.
(3). International Copyright, which enables American authors,
merely by complying with the provisions of this act, to secure copy-
right throughout all the important countries of the world without
further formalities.
(4). Extension of the period of Copyright.
(5). Mitigation of penalty for innocent infringement.
(6). Abolition of the present obligatory registration of a claim of
copyright.
Section 1, the provision affecting radio broadcasting, defines
the scope of protection, and provides that "such copyright in-
cludes the exclusive right",...
"To copy, print, reprint, publish, produce, reproduce, perform
render, exhibit, or transmit the copyrighted work in any form by any
means, and/or transform the same from any of its various forms into
any other forms, and to vend or otherwise dispose of such work; and
shall further include the exclusive rights ...
(g) to communicate said work to the public by radio broadcasting,
rebroadcasting, wired radio, telephoning, telegraphing, television, or by
'1 See editorials by Wigmore, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 799 (1931); 26 Ill. L.
Rev. 42 (1931-32).
77Davis, Copyright and Radio, 16 Va. L. Rev. 40 (1929).
,' H. R. 12549, 71st Congress, 2nd Session.
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any other methods or means for transmitting or delivering sounds,
words, images, or pictures whether now or hereafter existing."'
Though the Vestal Bill passed the House of Representatives,
it never reached the final calendar of the Senate, and Congress
failed to properly provide for the new field of endeavor. Other
legislation has appeared from time to time,80 but nothing very
constructive has as yet been done by our national legislators.
It is submitted, however, that the Model Copyright Act by
Louis G. Caldwell, of the Chicago and Washington Bars, is the
masterpiece in the field. 8 ' A glance at a few of its provisions is
enough to convince one of its worth. The sections on infringe-
ments read as follows:
Infringement. Section 9: "Copyright in a work shall be
deemed to be infringed by any person who, without the consent
of the copyright owner, does anything, the exclusive right to do
which is conferred by this act on the copyright owner, subject,
however, to the following...
Subsec. (e). Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent
the performance of any literary, dramatic, or musical vnork by means
of any recording or similar device unless a specific fee is charged for
admission to the place where such performance occurs." (Mr. Caldwell
tells us that by this section he is trying to prevent, so far as possible,
any claim for infringement by the copyright owner based on the play.
Ing of ordinary phonograph records or the operation of radio receiving
sets, in hotels, restaurants, ice cream parlors, barber shops, etc., where
a specific admission fee is not charged.) 2
Subsec. (f). "Copyright of a recording which has been publicly
sold or placed on sale, shall not extend to or prevent the broadcasting,
rebroadcasting, or public reception for profit of any performance made
by means of such recording."
(This section aims to restrict the copyright in recordings as such,
so as to avoid giving phonograph record manufacturers the power to
prevent the broadcasting of records, or use of such records in drug-
stores, barber shops, etc.)"
Subsec. (g). "The broadcasting or rebroadcasting of perform-
ances of literary or musical works, where purely incidental to the broad-
casting of public events and public occurrences and not originating
with or controlled by the broadcaster, shall not be deemed to be an
infringement by the broadcaster or by any receiving set proprietor;
71 For an excellent history and introduction to the Vestal Bill and
other legislation, see, Caldwell, The Broadcasting of Copyright Works,
1 J. Air L. 584 (1930); Simpson, The Copyright Situation as Affecting
Radio Broadcasting, 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 180 (1932); Solberg, The
Present Copyright Situation, 40 Yale L. J. 184 (1930); 1 J. Radio L.
390; 17 Cornell L. Q. 263, 267, notes 21 and 22; Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle
Co., 283 U. S. 191, footnote 10.
"Supra, n. 73.
2 J. Radio L. 315.
2 J. Radio L 315, 316.
"2 J. Radio L. 315, 323, footnote 26.
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nor shall any broadcasting or receiving set proprietor be held liable
for broadcasting, rebroadcasting, or public reception of any speech,
address, or similar matter over which the broadcaster is not permitted
by law to exercise censorship in advance."
(The purpose of this subsection is to give effect to the "single per-
formance" principle, so that, so far as possible, persons who perform a
copyrighted work will be solely responsible for any infringement result-
ing from that performance, and persons who merely communicate that
performance to the public and who have no means of protecting them-
selves against infringement by the performer, will be relieved of the
penalties of such infringement. For example, the playing of a band
at a football game, or political convention.) &
Subsec. (h). "As to any work copyrighted after this act shall
take effect, public reception of a broadcast or rebroadcast performance
shall not be deemed to be for profit unless a specific fee is charged for
admission to the place where such reception occurs."
In Section 19, subsection (e), the act provides that minimum
damages be reduced to $10.00. The present Act of Copyright
makes the minimum fee $250.00, so we can well see that Mr.
Caldwell appreciates the problem of the innocent infringer.
Section 20, subsection (g), reads as follows:
"Where the infringement complained of is the broadcasting of a
performance of a copyrighted work not produced by the broadcaster,
the remedies of the copyright owner (1) shall be available against the
broadcaster only if such broadcasting has not been authorized by the
producer of the performance, and (2) shall otherwise be available only
against the producer of the performance."
Subsec. (h). "Where the infringement complained of is the
public reception for profit of any broadcast performance of a copy-
righted work, the remedies of the copyright owner shall be available
against the person operating the reception installation only, (1) if such
reception has not been authorized by the broadcaster from whom the
performance is received."
It is submitted that it would be wise for our legislators to
adopt the Model Act, or to formulate an act on the same princi-
ples, and with similar provisions, which would protect innocent
infringers, minimize damages, clearly define the rights and
liabilities of all parties, and provide for future developments.
Radio is now a fabulous commercial enterprise. Hundreds
of stations with listening audiences running into the millions are
dotting the country everywhere. Much of the radio field is still
an unknown territory. The art is still in its infancy, though its
success has been assured. Further progress is inevitable. Tele-
vision broadcasting is being even now perfected, and in a near
future date, will be ready for national distribution.
The commercialization of the control of the air has engen-
dered many novel legal situations, with others to follow suit.
" 2 J. Radio L. 315.
K. L. J.-6
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Yet, specific legislation is still lacking. It is the duty of Con-
gress to provide proper laws for the new art. Proper legislation
would speed its even now rapid rise. The welfare of radio
should be carefully guarded. THE PROamoss op RADIO CON-
TIaUES.
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